The Claim and the Appeals
Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia arose from divorce proceedings in which the wife sought damages for abuse during the marriage. The trial judge found physical violence, prolonged emotional and psychological abuse, and financial control. Those findings were upheld by the Court of Appeal and formed the factual basis of the Supreme Court’s decision.
The trial judge recognized a tort of family violence and awarded $150,000: $50,000 in compensatory damages, $50,000 in aggravated damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. She also found liability under existing torts as an alternative basis for the award. The Court of Appeal rejected the new tort, upheld the compensatory and aggravated damages under existing torts, and set aside the punitive damages. Before the Supreme Court, the parties had agreed not to contest the remaining $100,000. The central issue was the legal basis for liability, rather than an increase in that amount.
The Tort Recognized by the Majority
Justice Kasirer, writing for five judges, recognized the tort of intimate partner violence. The majority identified coercive control as a distinct wrong that interferes with an intimate partner’s dignity, autonomy and equality. Existing torts, including assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress, did not adequately address that wrong and its resulting harm. The Court did not adopt the trial judge’s broader tort of family violence, which extended beyond intimate partnerships and included forms of liability that duplicated existing torts.
The plaintiff must establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the abusive conduct arose during an intimate partnership or its aftermath; that the defendant intentionally engaged in that conduct; and that the conduct, assessed objectively, constituted coercive control. The required intention concerns the conduct itself. The plaintiff need not prove a subjective intention to control the partner or cause a particular injury.
The objective inquiry considers how a reasonable person, fully informed of the relationship’s context, would understand the conduct and its effect on the plaintiff’s autonomy. A pattern of abuse may satisfy the test, but a single act can also do so when considered in context. Mere relationship dysfunction is insufficient, and a victim’s resistance to an aggressor must not be mischaracterized as coercive control. Once the three elements are proved, the harm to dignity, autonomy and equality follows without separate proof of consequential harm.
The Result
The majority held that the trial findings established all three elements. The husband’s physical assaults, psychological abuse and financial control formed a course of conduct that subordinated the wife and deprived her of autonomy within the relationship.
The appeal was allowed in part. The Court recognized liability under the new tort and changed the order to award $100,000 in general compensatory damages for intimate partner violence. That amount reflected the parties’ agreement not to contest the quantum; the Court did not restore the $50,000 punitive award or award a further $100,000 on top of the existing damages.
The majority also distinguished tort damages from statutory family-law remedies. It held that judges may determine the appropriate sequence for deciding tort and statutory claims, while keeping their different purposes analytically separate. There is no inflexible requirement to decide the statutory claims first.
The Separate Reasons
Justice Karakatsanis concurred in the result but would have recognized a broader tort. Her formulation would cover coercive control and acts or threats of violence causing physical or psychological harm within an intimate partnership, even without proof of coercive control.
Justice Jamal, joined by Justices Côté and Rowe, dissented. He considered existing torts sufficient to provide full compensation on these facts and would have dismissed the appeal. The three-part test set out by Justice Kasirer is the majority’s test; the broader concurrence and the dissent do not alter it.
